WATCHOUT WATCHMEN! CONGRESS HAS
EXCLUDED SECURITY EMPLOYEES FROM
"MARITIME EMPLOYMENT" COVERAGE UNDER
THE LONGSHORE AND HARBOR WORKERS'
COMPENSATION ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1984

Individuals employed exclusively to perform security work are no
longer covered under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA). Watchmen had been traditionally covered, both before and after Congress added a "status"test for coverage in 1972. This Comment argues that because Congress
eliminated the jurisdictional dilemma which formerly served as
the main justificationfor extending LHWCA coverage, the 1984
LHWCA amendments are consistent with judicial decisions extending coverage to watchmen.
INTRODUCTION

In 1984, the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act" (LHWCA) was amended 2 to exclude from coverage "individuals employed exclusively to perform office clerical, secretarial, security, or data processing work." 3 The 1984 LHWCA amendments con1. The LHWCA is now known as "The Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act," 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-50 (West Supp. 1985). The LHWCA is a remedial
statute enacted in 1927 (Act of Mar. 4, 1927, ch. 509, 44 Stat. 1424) which obligates
employers to compensate maritime employees for injuries incurred upon the navigable
waters of the United States "including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal,
building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an employer
in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel . . . ." 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1982).
Prior to its enactment, longshoremen and other maritime employees who were injured on
the seaward side of a pier were left without a compensation remedy, while those same
employees were protected by state compensation acts if their injuries were sustained on
the pier itself. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917); State Indus. Comm'n
v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U.S. 263 (1922). Although this gap in coverage was eliminated
by the LHWCA, the compensation system lacked uniformity because a determination of
benefits as state or federal depended on the "fortuitous circumstance of whether the injury [to the longshoreman] occurred on land or over water." (S. REP. No. 1125, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1972); H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1972). The
problem of shifting coverage was eliminated by an expansion of the covered situs area in
the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA. For further discussion of the 1972 amendments
see infra notes 5-11 and accompanying text.
2. As amended Sept. 28, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-426, §§ 2, 5(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1639,
1641, 1654 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-50 (West Supp. 1985)).
3. 33 U.S.C.A. § 902(3)(a) (West Supp. 1985). Section 902(3) Pub. L. No. 98July/August 1985 Vol. 22 No. 4

stitute an attempt by Congress to remove uncertainty with respect to
LHWCA coverage by clearly delineating the scope of maritime employment. 4 The uncertainty was created when the LHWCA was
amended in 19721 to include not only a broadened "situs" requirement," but an additional "status" requirement 7 for coverage.
426, § 2(a) designated former exclusions as subparts. Subsections (G) and (H) are added
subparts. The provisions are as follows:
The term "employee" means any person engaged in maritime employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations,
and any harbor-worker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker, but such term does not include
(A) individuals employed exclusively to perform office clerical, secretarial, security, or data processing work;
(B) individuals employed by a club, camp, recreational operation, restaurant,
museum, or retail outlet;
(C) individuals employed by a marina and who are not engaged in construction,
replacement, or expansion of such marina (except for routine maintenance);
(D) individuals who (i) are employed by suppliers, transporters, or vendors, (ii)
are temporarily doing business on the premises of an employer described in paragraph (4), and (iii) are not engaged in work normally performed by employees
of that employer under this chapter;
(E) aquaculture workers;
(F) individuals employed to build, repair, or dismantle any recreational vessel
under sixty-five feet in length;
(G) a master or member of a crew of any vessel; or
(H) any person engaged by a master to load or unload or repair any small vessel
under eighteen tons net;
if individuals described in clauses (A) through (F) are subject to coverage under
a State workers' compensation law.
4. 33 U.S.C.A. § 902(3) (West Supp. 1985).
5. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1972). The purpose of the 1972 amendments was to
achieve uniformity and fairness in LHWCA compensation by extending situs coverage
shoreward for the benefit of longshoremen, harbor-workers, and other employees engaged
in maritime employment. S. REP. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1972); H.R. REP.
No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1972). Maritime employees can now move freely from
ship to dock under the protective umbrella of the LHWCA. Additionally, Congress was
concerned with protecting amphibious workers from a perilous choice between two mutually exclusive compensation schemes. Holcomb v. Robert W. Kirk & Assoc., Inc., 11
BEN, REv. BD. SERv. (MB) 835, 842 (1981) (Miller, J. dissenting).
6. The "situs" requirement was formerly limited to injuries "occurring upon the
navigable waters of the United States including any dry dock . . . ."The 1972 amendments substantially broadened the LHWCA as follows:
Compensation shall be payable under this'chapter in respect of disability or
death of an employee, but only if the disability or death results from an injury
occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing,
or building a vessel) ....
33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1982).
7. The "status" requirement modified the types of employees covered by the
LHWCA. See H. BAER, ADMIRALTY LAW OF THE SUPREME COURT 246-47, 250 (1979);
Larson, The Conflicts Problem Between The Longshoremen's Act and the State Workmen's Act Under the 1972 Amendments, 14 Hous. L. Rav. 287, 291 (1977). Thus, after
1972 the claimant must meet both the place of injury situs test, and the following status
test:
The term "employee" means any person engaged in maritime employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations,
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The status requirement of § 902(3) restricted LHWCA benefits to
only those employees "engaged in maritime employment (including
any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations,
and any harborworker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder and a
shipbreaker ...

."I' Unfortunately, the phrase, "a person engaged

in maritime employment," was not defined in either the original
LHWCA1 ° nor in the 1972 amendments. Therefore, it was unclear
which employees, beyond "longshoremen" or "harbor workers," were
covered as "employees" under the LHWCA. The language of
§ 902(3), however, suggested that "maritime employment" was

broader than the specific occupations listed."'
The legislative history of the 1984 LHWCA amendments indi-

cates that Congress intended to exclude individuals employed exclusively as watchmen or security guards from the term "employee,"

and thus from coverage under the LHWCA. The exclusion holds
even if the individuals are employed by maritime employers, "be-

cause the nature of their work does not expose them to traditional
maritime hazards."12 Conversely, an individual performing exclusively clerical work outside of an office in an 1area
where cargo is
3
handled remains within the LHWCA coverage.
Watchmen or security guards injured upon navigable waters traditionally have been covered as persons "engaged in maritime employand any harborworker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker,
but such term does not include a master or member of a crew of any vessel, or
any person engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel
under eighteen tons net.
33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1982).
The "status" requirement has been amended as noted, supra note 3.
8. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(1982).
9. Id.
10. Act. of Mar. 4, 1927, ch. 509, 44 Stat. 1424.
11. See Miller v. Central Dispatch, Inc., 673 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1982); Hullinghorst Indus., Inc. v. Carroll, 650 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1981); Mississippi Coast Marine,
Inc. v. Bosarge, 637 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1981); Trotti & Thompson v. Crawford, 631
F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1980); Odom Constr. Co., Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 622
F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981).
12. 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2736.
13. Id. at 2737. The Senate Committee on Education and Labor notes that:
Not all clerical work is intended to be excluded - merely that which is performed exclusively in a business office of the employing enterprise. Workers who
may be classified as clerks or cargo checkers, for example, may be deemed to be
engaged, at times, in "clerical" type work, but that work is done in the areas in
which cargo is handled, not exclusively in a business office of the stevedore. In
such circumstances, the checker or clerk would remain within Longshore Act
jurisdiction.
Id.

ment" under the pre-1972 amendment LHWCA. 14 Moreover, the
United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fifth, and Ninth
Circuits have held that watchmen were engaged in maritime employment as required for coverage under § 902(3) of the post-1972
amendment LHWCA. 15
For years, the Benefits Review Board (BRB) 16 of the United
States Department of Labor, created by the 1972 amendments to

hear appeals regarding an employee's status under the LHWCA,
consistently held that watchmen were not involved in an integral

part of the longshoring process and, thus, were not engaged in maritime employment. 17 Only with reluctance has the BRB followed recent circuit court decisions extending LHWCA coverage to
watchmen. 18
This Comment argues that the exclusion of watchmen from
LHWCA coverage by Congress is justified because the earlier juris-

dictional dilemma, forcing amphibious watchmen to choose between
two mutually exclusive state and federal compensation schemes, has
14. Rex Investigative & Patrol Agency, Inc. v. Collura, 329 F. Supp. 696
(E.D.N.Y. 1971); Interlake S.S. Co. v. Nielsen, 338 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1964); Hillcone
S.S. Co. v. Steffen, 136 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1943); Lowe v. Central R.R. Co. of N.J., 113
F.2d 413 (3d Cir. 1940); Puget Sound Nay. Co. v. Marshall, 31 F. Supp. 903 (W.D.
Wash. 1940); Union Oil Co. v. Pillsbury, 63 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1933); Seneca Washed
Gravel Corp. v. McManiga, 65 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1933). Cf. John Baizley Iron Works v.
Span, 281 U.S. 222 (1930).
15. Kelly v. Marine Terminals Corp., 678 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1982); Miller v.
Central Dispatch, Inc., 673 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1982); Holcomb v. Robert W. Kirk &
Assoc., Inc., 655 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1981); Arbeeny v. McRoberts Protective Agency,
642 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1981).
16. Under the 1972 amendments, contested compensation claims are heard by an
administrative law judge. 33 U.S.C. § 919(d) (1982). Review is then available before the
BRB, a three-member board appointed by the Secretary of Labor. The BRB is empowered "to hear and determine appeals raising a substantial question of law or fact tiken
by any party in interest from decisions with respect to claims of employees under [the
LHWCA]." 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(1), (3) (1982). The 1984 LHWCA amendments have
expanded the size of the BRB from three members to five. Further, to assist the BRB in
clearing up the backlog of claims, section 21 is amended to authorize the secretary to
appoint three Administrative Law Judges of the Department of Labor to serve as temporary members of the Board for periods of 18 months, whenever the backlog of cases
exceeds 1,000. Also, all administrative functions of the BRB are delegated to the chairman of the Board so that members need not spend time on purely administrative functions. 1984 U.S. CODE CONG, & AD. NEws 2734, 2754-55. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 801-902
(1979) for the rules of practice and procedure governing appeals before the BRB. The
decisions of the BRB are subject to review by the federal courts of appeals. 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 921(c) (\Vest Supp. 1985).
17. Kelly v. Marine Terminals Corp., 13 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 609 (1981);
Vaughn v. Lansdell Protective Agency, 13 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 677 (1981); Miller
v. Central Dispatch, Inc., 12 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 793 (1980); Conlon v. McRoberts Protective Agency, Inc., 12 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 473 (1980); Arbeeny v.
McRoberts Protective Agency, Inc., 12 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 435 (1980); Holcomb
v. Robert W. Kirk & Assoc., Inc., 11 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 835 (1980).
18. Birdwell v. Western Tug & Barge, 16 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 321 (1984);
Groslovis v. American Patrol Serv., 15 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 184 (1982).
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been eliminated by the 1984 LHWCA amendments.19 This rationale
is consistent with pre-1972 amendment decisions extending coverage
to watchmen injured upon navigable waters, and post-1972 amendment decisions extending coverage to amphibious watchmen, although injured on a land-based situs adjoining navigable waters.
This Comment will trace both pre-1972 amendment and post-1972
amendment decisions extending LHWCA coverage to watchmen to
demonstrate the soundness of the 1984 LHWCA amendments. It
will note that goals of uniformity of coverage and jurisdictional certainty are not abandoned by the exclusion of security personnel from
LHWCA coverage. Purely shore-based watchmen never faced the
problem of shifting coverage or jurisdictional uncertainty eliminated
by the 1984 LHWCA amendments. Therefore, prior to their exclusion, they had to independently satisfy the status requirement of
§ 902(3) by showing that: (1) their duties bore a realistically significant relationship to navigation and commerce;2" (2) they were engaged in an integral part of the longshoring process; 21 or (3) they
were harbor-workers.2 2 Contrary to assertions in recent appellate decisions, land-based watchmen do not satisfy any of the above tests
for status coverage, thus justifying their exclusion under the 1984
LHWCA amendments. Finally, this Comment will explore the
problems of interpreting which employees are within an excluded
category of the amended LHWCA.
The Pre-1972 Amendment LHWCA and the "status" of
Watchmen
Congress enacted the original 1927 LHWCA in response to judicial decisions holding "that the states were without power, and Congress could not delegate to them power, to provide compensation for
19. 33 U.S.C.A. § 902(3) (West Supp. 1985). "[T]hese exceptions are conditioned upon an individual being subject to coverage under a state workers' compensation
law. Thus, if a state law exempts from coverage an individual who otherwise falls within
any of the above exceptions of the Longshore Act, the Longshore exemption would not
apply." 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2772.
20. Herb's Welding v. Gray, 703 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1983); Mississippi Coast
Marine v. Bosarge, 637 F.2d 994, 998 (5th Cir. 1981); Pippen v. Shell Oil Co., 661 F.2d
378, 382 (5th Cir. 1981); Odom Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 622 F.2d 110, 113
(5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981); Weyerhaeuser v. Gilmore, 529 F.2d
957, 961 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868 (1976); See also Sealand Service
Inc. v. Director OWCP, 540 F.2d 629 (3d Cir. 1976).
21.
22.

33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1982).
Id.

longshoremen injured on navigable waters." 2 3 In extending federal
coverage to a worker, Congress was concerned solely with the situs

of an employee's injury. The only mention in the LHWCA to the
undefined term
"maritime employment" was in the definition of
"employer. '2 4 It required that the employer have at least one employee partly engaged in maritime employment upon the navigable
waters of the United States. 5 Therefore, an employee injured upon
navigable waters was not required to be engaged in maritime employment at the time of injury. The terms "injury" 2 6 and "employee,"' 27 as defined by Congress, made no reference to the maritime status of a worker as a coverage prerequisite.
In the pre-1972 amendment judicial decisions construing the maritime employment status of watchmen, the courts distinguished be-

tween employment which aided navigation and employment which
was related to navigation. Employment which aided navigation was
considered employment by crew members who were and continue to
be excluded from coverage under the LHWCA.2 s Employment
which was related to navigation was deemed maritime in character
and included employment activity by essentially all other non-crew
members injured upon navigable waters.29 Under the "maritime but
23. Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924). See also Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S.
205 (1917).
24. 33 U.S.C. § 902(4) (1982). This section provided as follows: "[t]he term 'employer' means an employer any of whose employees are employed in maritime employment, in whole or in part, upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any
drydock)." Id.
25. Id.
26. 33 U.S.C. § 902(2) (1982). This section provided as follows: "[t]he term 'injury' means accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment,
and such occupational disease or infection as arises naturally or unavoidably results from
such accidental injury . . . ." Id.
27. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1982). This section provided as follows: "[t]he term 'employee' does not include a master or member of a crew of any vessel, nor any person
engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel under eighteen tons
net." Id.
28. 33 U.S.C.A. § 902(3) (West Supp. 1985). Seamen, however, are entitled to
"maintenance and cure," a remedy under the general maritime law, for illness or injury
incurred in the service of a vessel. See 30 R. Cas. 1171-1216. In the event of injury or
death in the course of performing their duties, they or their survivors may also sue for
damages based on unseaworthiness, a strict liability remedy for failure to provide a safe
workplace under the general maritime law. Seamen may also sue for damages on a negligence theory under the Jones Act., 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982).
29. Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114 (1962) (affirming a lower court
award of LHWCA benefits for a welder injured while working on an uncompleted drilling barge); Penn. R.R. Co. v. O'Rourke, 344 U.S. 334 (1953) (allowing LHWCA benefits to a railroad worker injured on navigable waters); Davis v. Dep't of Labor and Indus., 317 U.S. 249 (1942) (holding that coverage under LHWCA would have been
available for a steel construction worker who worked on navigable water, although his
job related solely to bridge building); Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc., 314 U.S. 244
(1941) (upholding a finding that a janitor whose only maritime activity was one trip as a
lookout on a boat was "engaged in maritime employment"). See also DeBardelebon Coal
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local doctrine," however, state compensation acts were allowed to
cover certain injuries on navigable waters due to the local nature of
the injury.30
1 a former third officer
In Union Oil Co. v. Pillsbury,"
of a ship
was paid off and discharged when the ship entered port. He was
later rehired as a night watchman. Subsequently, while engaged in
the performance of his watchman duties, he was shot by a burglar.
Rejecting the argument that the injured employee was a crewman at
the time of the shooting, the court stated that his activities were not
only maritime in nature, but were also of more than merely local
significance.3 2 Employment was considered maritime in character,
and thus related to navigation and commerce, based solely on the
watchman's presence aboard ship at the time of his injury. The court
did not undertake a functional analysis of a watchman's duties and
their relationship to navigation and commerce.
The Union Oil court distinguished between those local maritime
activities having only an incidental relation to navigation and commerce and maritime activities deemed covered under the LHWCA
on the basis of the "more or less permanent location" of the vessel. 33
Therefore, in Sunny Point Packing Co. v. Faigh," a case decided
the same day, the court refused to apply the LHWCA to a watchman who was lost at sea during a storm while guarding a commercial fish trap anchored in the navigable waters of Alaska. The court
upheld the application of the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act,
because the fish trap was connected by cable to shore.3 5 The fixed
nature of the floating situs, however, did not resolve the issue of local
coverage. An examination of the intent of the ship owner regarding
the continued grounding of the vessel was required. 36
In Hillcone Steamship Co. v. Steffen, 7 a watchman was injured
as a result of a fall while guarding a vessel which was "indefinitely
Corp. v. Henderson, 142 F.2d 481, 482-83 (5th Cir. 1944); Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Branham, 136 F.2d 873, 875 (4th Cir. 1943); Peter v. Arrien, 325 F. Supp. 1361, 1365
(E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 463 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1968).
30. See Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rhode, 257 U.S. 469, 476-77 (1922);
Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 242 (1921). See generally G. GILMORE & C.
BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 6-49 (2d ed. 1975).
31. 63 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1933).
32.

Id. at 926.

33. Id.
34. 63 F.2d 921 (9th Cir. 1933).
35. Sunny Point Packing, 63 F.2d at 926.
36. Hillcone S.S. Co. v. Steffen, 136 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1943); Puget Sound Nay.
Co. v. Marshall, 31 F. Supp. 903 (W. D. Wash. 1940).
37. 136 F.2d 965, 966 (9th Cir. 1943).

laid-up," but which its owners intended to eventually return to navigation and commerce. The Ninth Circuit held that the injury occurred in the course of maritime employment. Presumably, if the
owners of the vessel had not intended to put it back into service on
the high seas, the watchman's activity would have had only an incidental relationship to navigation and commerce. Therefore, his service would have been local in nature and his injury noncompensable
under the LHWCA.
Similarly, in Puget Sound Navigation Co. v. Marshall,3 8 employment as a watchman on a laid-up ferry-boat was found to be related
to commerce and navigation and thus maritime in nature. The court,
like the court in Hillcone, rejected the employer's contention that
the ferry was sufficiently divorced from commerce and navigation to
meet the "local concern" test.39 In extending federal coverage, it distinguished between a vessel resting temporarily at a dock"0 which
was covered under the LHWCA and an uncompleted ship lying in
navigable waters.41 Additionally, the court quoted the Supreme
Court of the State of Washington for the proposition that the primary criterion for determining the type of compensation to be
awarded depended on where the injury was sustained. 41 If the workman was injured over navigable waters, federal maritime law governed. If the injury occurred on land, the state compensation system
43
applied, despite the maritime nature of the workman's activity.
This rationale was embraced by the court in Rex Investigative and
Patrol Agency v. Collura,44 where a watchman's injury aboard ship
was a mere temporary incident of his employment. The court, in
granting LHWCA benefits, held that the place of injury and not the
nature of4 the employment was dispositive regarding federal
coverage. 5
These decisions strongly support the conclusion that watchmen injured upon navigable waters were traditionally covered by the
LHWCA, and therefore suffered shifting coverage when they left
ship. Pre-1972 amendment decisions, however, offered no support for
the proposition that maritime employment coverage of a watchman
was related to anything but his presence on navigable waters.
In Holcomb v. Robert W. Kirk & Associates, Inc.,4" a 1981 case,
38. 31 F. Supp. 903 (W.D. Wash. 1940).
39. Id. at 907.
40. Id. (citing Gonsalves, 266 U.S. at 171).
41. Id. (citing Grant Smith-Porter, 257 U.S. at 469).
42. Id. at 906-07 (citing Puget Sound Bridge Co. v. Dep't of Labor Indus., 185
Wash. 349, 352, 52 P.2d 1003, 1005 (1936)).
43. Id.
44. 329 F. Supp. 696 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
45. Id. at 698.
46. 655 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983).
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the Fifth Circuit cited these pre-1972 amendment decisions 47 in reversing the BRB's denial of coverage under the post-1972 amended

LHWCA. Claimant Holcomb, a night watchman, was permanently
disabled when he fell through an "open hatch" on the vessel he was
guarding.48 Yet, as pointed out by the BRB majority, which held
that claimant Holcomb did not meet the status requirement of the

amended LHWCA, "the pre-[1972] amendment cases which do not
contain a functional analysis of the work of an employee, as contemplated by Congress
when it added the status test to the Act, are no
49

longer useful."

A brief examination of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the

"status" requirement under § 902(3) of the post-1972 amended
LHWCA supports the use of this functional, "occupational" test 50

for determining the maritime status of land-based employees and
justifies the exclusion of watchmen under the 1984 LHWCA
amendments.
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATION OF THE "STATUS"
REQUIREMENT ADOPTED IN THE 1972 LHWCA AMENDMENTS

The "Occupational" Test for Maritime Status
As previously mentioned, the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA
broadened the "situs" test by redefining the area incorporated by the
term "navigable waters." 5 1 The original LHWCA52 had not provided
for compensation to persons injured on land. 53 This result seemed
unfair, especially in the case of longshoremen who moved back and
forth from ship to dock, constantly moving in and out of covered
zones.5 4 Similarly, with the advent of containerization55 of cargo,
47. Id. at 593 (citing Hillcone S.S. Co. v. Steffen, 136 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1943));
Union Oil Co. v. Pillsbury, 63 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1933); Rex Investigative & Patrol
Agency, Inc., v. Colura, 329 F. Supp. 696 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Puget Sound Nay. Co. v.
Marshall, 31 F. Supp. 903 (W.D. Wash. 1940)).
48. Holcomb, 655 F.2d at 590.
49. Holcomb v. Robert W. Kirk & Assoc., Inc., 11 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB)
835, 840 n.3 (1980), rev'd, 655 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1981). See also Arbeeny v. McRoberts Protective Agency, Inc., 12 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 436, 437 n.3 (1980), rev'd,
642 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1981).
50. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977); P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69 (1979).
51. 33 U.S.C.A. § 903(a) (West Supp. 1985).
52. Act of Mar. 4, 1927, ch. 509, 44 Stat. 1424.
53. See, e.g., Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212 (1969) (denying
coverage for an injury occurring on a structure permanently affixed to land).
54. See Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 259-60 (1977).
55. Containerization is the modern process of handling storage in large metal

many longshoremen worked exclusively on terminals stripping and
stuffing containers 6
Concurrent with broadening the "situs" area, Congress created a
"status" requirement under § 902(3) to restrict LHWCA benefits to
those employees "engaged in maritime employment (including any
longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations,
and any harbor worker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and
a shipbreaker .

.. ,". The statutory ambiguity created by the

phrase, "a person engaged in maritime employment" 8 was described
well by the Second Circuit in Fusco v. Perini North River Association59 The court observed:
Etymologically, the critical phrase [maritime employment] could have an
occupational, or a geographical interpretation or both: That is, it could refer
to a person engaged in an occupation characteristically associated with the
sea or other navigable waters, 6and/or to a person engaged in work upon the
sea or other navigable waters. '

The Supreme Court, in two decisions, 61 embraced an "occupational" connotation for "maritime employment" which focused on
the maritime character of the worker's occupation or employment
activity. The Court rejected the "geographical" approach 2 which
was based on the "point of rest" doctrine63 - that maritime employment includes "only the portion of the unloading process that takes
place before the stevedoring gang places cargo onto the dock."'64 The
"occupational" approach is consistent with the intent of Congress to

broaden the situs for coverage while restricting the class of employees covered under § 902(3).

In Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo,65 the Supreme
Court considered together the separate awards for claimants Blundo
boxes which can be lifted off the vessel, thereby permitting the time consuming loading
and unloading process to be performed on land. Under traditional break-bulk cargo-handling, each item of cargo had to be handled separately and stored individually in the hold
of the ship. See Caputo, 432 U.S. at 270.
56. Id. at 269-71.
57. 33 U.S.C.A. § 902(3) (West Supp. 1985).
58.
59.

Id.
601 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980),

rev'd, 622 F.2d 1111 (2d Cir. 1980). Fusco was reversed in light of the Supreme Court's
opinion in P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69 (1979), wherein the Supreme Court
rejected the "geographical" approach to status originally adopted by the court in Fusco.
60. Fusco, 601 F.2d at 663.
61.

Caputo, 432 U.S. at 249; P.C. Pfeiffer Co., 444 U.S. at 69.

62. Caputo, 432 U.S. at 249.
63. According to the "point of rest" doctrine, an employee would be covered as a
longshoreman (or other person engaged in longshoring operations) only if he was injured
while unloading cargo from the ship to what was termed the "first point of rest," i.e., the
first place where cargo was deposited on a pier or terminal area after being unloaded (or
while loading cargo on to the ship from the "last point of rest"). Caputo, 432 U.S. at
274-75.
64. Id.
65. 432 U.S. 249 (1977).

[VOL. 22: 941, 1985]

Watchout Watchmen!
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

and Caputo which had been affirmed by the Second Circuit in Pittson Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura.68 Claimant Carmelo Blundo
was employed as a "checker" at the time of his injury. Responsibilities of a checker included checking and recording cargo as it was
loaded on or off "vessels, barges or containers.""7 Blundo, due to a
fall on an icy pier, was injured while checking and marking cargo
stripped from a container.68 Claimant Ralph Caputo, a longshoreman, had been hired on a temporary basis as a terminal worker. He
was loading cheese on the truck of a consignee for final transhipment
at the time of his injury.69
The administrative law judge issued awards to both claimants
under the amended LHWCA.70 The BRB71 and the Second Circuit
affirmed.72 The Supreme Court, in extending coverage to the claimants, stated that the broad language of the 1972 amendments should
be liberally construed to avoid "harsh and incongruous results." 7 3
There
was no question that both men were injured on a covered "situs. 17 4 The sole question for the Court was whether or not they met
the "status" provision of § 902(3).
The Court granted claimant Blundo coverage under the amended
LHWCA, because the checking of cargo had become integral to
longshoring operations due to the advent of containerization. 5 Since
the large containers could be lifted from the ship directly onto the
pier, the Court concluded that the legislature was concerned with
preventing shifting coverage resulting from the shoreward movement
of longshoremen. 6
Although the Court did not determine that claimant Caputo was
engaged in maritime activity at the time of his injury, it did focus on
his occupation as a longshoreman in affirming coverage.7 7 Essen66. 544 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1976).
67. Caputo, 432 U.S. at 252-53.
68. Id. at 253.
69. Id. at 255.
70. See In re Caputo, 2 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 4 (ALJ) (1975); In re
Blundo, 1 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 71 (ALJ) (1975).
71. See Caputo v. Northeast Marine Terminal Co., 3 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB)
13 (1975); Blundo v. International Terminal Operating Co., 2 BEN. REv. BD. SERV.
(MB) 376 (1975).
72. Pittson Stevedering Corp. v Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd
in part, 432 U.S. 249 (1977).
73.

Caputo, 432 U.S. at 268 (citing Voris v. Eikel, 346 U.S. 328, 333 (1953)).

74. Id. at 279-80.
75. Id. at 270. See also supra note 55.
76.

Caputo, 432 U.S. at 271.

77. Id. at 252-53.

tially, the Court adopted a dual test of status for coverage under the
LHWCA whereby "an employee who is not engaged in an 'integral
part of the unloading process' will not fall within the coverage of the
[a]ct unless his occupation is of a traditional maritime nature. '17 By
focusing on the activities of the employee, the Court extended coverage to Blundo, who was injured while engaged in loading or unloading maritime cargo,7 9 and to Caputo, whose employment required
him to spend significant time performing traditional longshoring
activities. 80
Unfortunately, the Court declined to identify which activities
(other than "checking") and which occupations (other than "longshoring") met the requirements of § 902(3). The reasoning of the
Court in Caputo is useful, however, because if land-based workers
are, for example, "harbor workers," then they need not be engaged
in strictly maritime activity at the time of their injury. Additionally,
if at the time of their injury their duties can be characterized as part
of "longshoring operations," then the status requirement of § 902(3)
will have been met.
In P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford,"' the Supreme Court reiterated its
adoption of an "occupational" status test by unanimously holding
that all workers involved in moving cargo between ship and land
transportation were engaged in longshoring operations.82 Coverage
was extended to two land-based workers, Ford and Bryant. Claimant
Ford was a member of a warehousemen's union whose members
were prohibited from engaging in longshoring tasks such as moving
cargo directly to or from a vessel. Ford was injured on a public dock
while fastening military vehicles onto railroad fiat cars. The vehicles
had been delivered by ship to port. The flat cars were to transport
the vehicles to their inland destination. Claimant Bryant, a cotton
header, was also restricted in his work. Cotton headers were only
permitted to load cotton moved within or between warehouses; they
were not permitted to move cargo directly to or from ships. Bryant
was injured while unloading a bale of cotton from a dray wagon into
a pier warehouse.8 3 Similar to its treatment of "checker" Blundo in
Caputo, the Supreme Court found these land-based workers to be
78. Conti v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 566 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1977). For a broader
discussion of the "dual test" of status approach, see Note, Longshoremen, Longshoring
Operations,and Maritime Employment: A Dual Test of Status After Northeast Marine
Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 64 VA. L. REV. 99, 112-17 (1978).
79. Caputo, 432 U.S. at 253.
80. Id. at 255.
81. 444 U.S. 69 (1979).
82. Id. at 82. The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's award of compensation in Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue, 539 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1976), vacated
and remanded, 433 U.S. 904 (1977), aff'd on remand, 575 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1978) (per
curiam).
83. Pfeiffer, 444 U.S. at 71-72.
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engaged in an integral part of the loading or unloading process. As
in Caputo, the focus was upon the nature, not the location, of
employment.
An examination of two recent Supreme Court decisions reveals
that a different standard for "maritime employment" may be applied
to amphibious workers. For land-based workers to be deemed engaged in maritime employment, the weight of authority in the circuit
courts is that their employment activities must have a "realistically
significant relationship to traditional maritime activities involving
navigation and commerce on navigable waters." 84 Conversely, the
Supreme Court in Director, OWCP v. Perini North River Associates,815 held that it was neither necessary nor correct to apply the

significant relationship test to workers injured on navigable waters.
The fact that the worker was injured on navigable waters in the
course of employment is itself sufficient to satisfy the status requirement of § 902(3).86 The Court reiterated its belief set forth in
Caputo, that "[b] oth the text and the history [of the section] demonstrate a desire to provide continuous coverage to these amphibious
workers who, without the 1972 amendments, would be covered only
for part of their activity." 8
This view was consistent with an earlier decision in Sun Ship Inc.
84. See supra cases cited note 20. As to land-based workers, for example, the
Third Circuit in Sea-land Service, Inc. v. Director OWCP, 540 F.2d 629 (3d Cir. 1976),
held that the crucial test involved an examination of an employee's activities based upon
their functional relationship to maritime transportation at the time of injury, as opposed
to their relationship to other land-based activities. Id. at 638. Recently, the Fifth Circuit
in Pippen v. Shell Oil Co., 661 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1981), adopted a more liberal view of
the significant relationship test. The court, in finding that offshore drilling upon navigable waters had a "significant relationship" to traditional maritime activity, stated that
the test was met when the purpose of the employee's activity was to "facilitate maritime
commerce." Id. at 383-84.
85. 459 U.S. 297 (1983).
86. Id. at 324.
87. Caputo, 432 U.S. at 273. In Perini,the Court stated:
There is nothing in these comments, or anywhere else in the legislative reports,
to suggest as Perini claims, that Congress intended the status language to require that an employee injured upon the navigable waters in the course of his
employment possessed a direct (or substantial) relation to navigation or commerce in order to be covered. Congress was concerned with injuries on land, and
assumed that injuries occurring on the actual navigable waters were covered and
would remain covered.
Perini,459 U.S. at 318-19. Other appellate court decisions which have embraced coverage for amphibious workers both before and after its recognition by the Supreme Court
in Perini include: Novelties Distribution Corp. v. Molee, 710 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1983);
Ward v. Director, OWCP, 684 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170
(1983); Boudreaux v. American Workover, Inc. 680 F.2d 1034, 1035-36 (5th Cir. 1982)
(en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983).

v. Pennsylvania,88 where the Court held that a state may apply its
workers' compensation scheme to land-based injuries that fall within
the coverage of the 1972 amendments.89 The Court was concerned in
Sun Ship, as it was in Perini,90 with preventing the resurrection of
the jurisdictional monstrosity which left a claimant to choose, at his
peril, between two mutually exclusive compensation schemes. 91
Prior to the 1972 LHWCA amendments, the Supreme Court clarified this jurisdictional dilemma in Davis v. Department of Labor.92
In Davis, the Court upheld state compensation even though
LHWCA coverage was available and the applicability of state law
was uncertain. According to the Court, this "twilight zone" of concurrent jurisdiction was designed to prevent a wrong guess on the
question of which compensation scheme applied. Likewise, in Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co., 93 the Court rejected the state exclusivity of the "maritime but local" doctrine94 and held that LHWCA
coverage existed for all injuries incurred by employees on navigable
waters. 95
Additionally, in amending the LHWCA in 1972, Congress expressly deleted language which precluded federal compensation unless "recovery for disability or death through workmen's compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by state law." 96 The
Court in Perini attributed this action to an acquiescence by Congress
to the rationale in 97
Calbeck which sought to prevent a hazardous juchoice.
risdictional
As long as amphibious watchmen, therefore, like the watchman in
Holcomb,9 8 faced the possibility of choosing the wrong compensation
scheme, the extension of LHWCA benefits to amphibious guards
served an important purpose. This jurisdictional dilemma plaguing
amphibious watchmen, however, was eliminated by the 1984

88. 447 U.S. 715 (1980).
89. Id.
90. Perini, 459 U.S. 297.
91. Id. at 323.
92. 317 U.S. 249 (1942).
93. 370 U.S. 114 (1962).
94. Id. at 120.
95. Id. at 124.
96. Act of Mar. 4, 1927 ch. 509, 44 Stat. 1424.
97. Perini, 459 U.S. at 309.
98. 11 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 835 (1980), rev'd, 655 F.2d 589 (5th Cir.
1981). The BRB decision produced the anomalous and tragic result of a worker injured
upon navigable waters who was without either a state or federal worker's compensation
remedy for his loss of health and wage earning capacity. The BRB denied the claim
despite a prior determination denying the claimant workers' compensation benefits under
the Florida State Compensation Act. The Fifth Circuit later reversed the decision of the
BRB without addressing the issue. Holcomb, 655 F.2d at 589. For a further discussion of
the decision, see supra notes 46-49, and infra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
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LHWCA amendments. 99 A guard exempt from coverage under a
state compensation scheme will remain covered under the LHWCA,
despite the exclusive nature of the guard duties performed. 10 0 Thus,
the rationale of preventing a hazardous jurisdictional choice supports
the extension of LHWCA benefits to "exclusively security" personnel denied state coverage.

Since purely land-based watchmen or pier guards never had to
face this jurisdictional dilemma or shifting federal coverage, the extension of LHWCA benefits to them could only be justified on the
basis of the maritime nature of guard work. To be engaged in maritime employment, land-based watchmen had to satisfy the "significant relationship" to maritime activity test.1 0 ' An examination of the

appellate decisions supporting the maritime status of watchmen reveal that most of those pre-Perini decisions were based on the am-

phibious nature of the guards' work and the accompanying dilemma
of uncertain jurisdictional choice. To the extent, however, that those

decisions supported the inclusion of purely land-based watchmen
within the restricted class of maritime employees set forth in
§ 902(3), they were inconsistent with congressional intent and offer
no support for criticizing the exclusion of watchmen under the 1984
LHWCA amendments.
The Position of the Benefits Review Board

The BRB, 102 in a series of six decisions, 0 3 ruled that the activities
of watchmen do not constitute an integral part of the loading and
unloading process, and that watchmen, therefore, were not engaged
99. 33 U.S.C.A. § 902(3) (West Supp. 1985). See supra note 19.
100. 33 U.S.C.A. § 902(3) (West Supp. 1985).
101. For a general view of the application of the "significant relationship" test see
Warren Bros. v. Nelson, 635 F.2d 552, 556 (6th Cir. 1980); Boudloche v. Howard
Trucking Co., Inc., 632 F.2d 1346, 1347 (5th Cir. 1980); Trotti & Thompson v. Crawford, 631 F.2d 1214, 1220-21 n.15 (5th Cir. 1980) (act of building pier furthers process
of loading and unloading vessels and thus bears a significant relationship to longshoring
operations); Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co. v. Kininess, 554 F.2d 176, 178 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903 (1977) (shipbuilding company employee's act of assemblying crane to be used in shipbuilding process furthers maritime function of "shipbuilding" and thus constitutes maritime employment). See also cases cited supra note 20.
102. See supra note 16.
103. Kelly v. Marine Terminals Corp., 13 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 609 (1981);
Vaughn v. Lansdell Protective Agency, 13 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 677 (1981); Miller
v. Central Dispatch, Inc., 12 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 793 (1980); Conlon v. McRoberts Protective Agency, Inc.; 12 BEN. REv. BD. SERV. (MB) 473 (1980); Arbeeny v.
McRoberts Protective Agency, Inc., 12 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 435 (1980); Holcomb
v. Robert W. Kirk & Assoc., Inc., 11 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 835 (1980).

in maritime employment within the meaning of § 902(3). In each
case, Administrative Appeals Judge Miller registered a strong dissent. 10 4 The factual situations presented and the analysis provided by

the BRB were very similar in each of those decisions.
In each case, a watchman, who was subject to assignment aboard
ship, 10 5 was injured on a covered situs, (e.g., a pier)10 6 while providing protection against pilferage of cargo 0 7 or while guarding a
ship.108 A divided BRB denied coverage in these cases on the basis
that providing security for cargo is not an integral part of longshoring operations (i.e., the loading and unloading process) nor does it
have a "realistically significant relationship to maritime activities involving navigation and commerce." 109 Additionally, according to the
BRB, watchmen were not "longshoremen" 110 or "harbor-workers" 11
but merely provided support services incidental to any business
104. See cases cited supra note 103.
105. In Vaughn v. Lansdell Protective Agency, 13 BEN. REV. BD.SERV. (MB) 677
(1981), the BRB found the distinction between shipguards and pierguards irrelevant to
their maritime status under the LHWCA. The BRB stated, "the mere fact that security
guards work on a pier or ship alongside longshoremen cannot transform their duties into
longshoring or maritime employment." Id. at 679. Furthermore, "even if [the] claimant
had performed work on actual navigable waters, this fact alone would not require coverage. . . ." Id. at 680. Moreover, in Pfeiffer, 444 U.S. at 69, the Supreme Court held
that the status requirement in § 902(3) contains occupational and not geographical requirements, and therefore rejected the contention that the LHWCA only covers workers
who are working or who may be assigned to work over the water itself. All of the decisions listed supra note 103 involved amphibious watchmen.
106. See Kelly v. Marine Terminals Corp., 13 BEN. REV. BD.SERV. (MB) 609, 610
(1981) (claimant, a waterfront security guard, was injured when he tripped and fell
while making his rounds in employer's container storage yard); Vaughn v. Lansdell Protective Agency, 13 BEN. REV. BD. SERv. (MB) 677, 678 (1981) (claimant was injured
while working in a cargo stuffing shed); Conlon v. McRoberts Protective Agency, Inc., 12
BEN. REV. BD.SERV. (MB) 473, 474 (1980) (claimant, whose principal duties involved
insuring the security of cargo on piers, was injured when he slipped and fell on an icy
pier); Arbeeny v. McRoberts Protective Agency, Inc., 12 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB)
435, 436 (1980) (claimant, whose principal duty was to insure against cargo pilferage
mainly in pier areas, was injured when he was struck by a "hi-lo" machine on a covered
pier).
107. Conlon, 12 BEN. REV. BD.SERV. (MB) at 473; Arbeeny, 12 BEN. REV. BD.
SERv. (MB) 435.
108. See Holcomb, 11 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) at 836 (claimant Holcomb,
whose primary duty was to watch a ship, was injured when he fell through an open
hatchway on the vessel's deck). See supra note 98, and infra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
109. See cases cited supra in notes 103-08. The BRB's definition is a modification
of that found in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Gilmore, 528 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868 (1976), which requires that employee work "have a realistically significant relationship to traditional maritime activities involving 'navigation and commerce on navigable waters.'" Holcomb, I1 BEN. REV. BD.SERV. (MB) at 837 (emphasis
added). The BRB stated that the Weyerhaeuser definition "is too restrictive, insofar as it
requires a relationship to 'traditional' maritime activities and 'the traditional work and
duties of a ship's service employment.'" Id.
I10. Arbeeny, 12 BEN. REV. BD.SERV. (MB) at 437.
I 1. Vaughn, 13 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) at 679.
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operation.112
Judge Miller, in his dissenting opinions, strongly criticized the denial of coverage by the BRB. Judge Miller presented four substantive arguments for holding that watchmen were covered employees
under pre-1984 amendment § 902(3): (1) watchmen activities form
an integral part of longshoring operations; (2) watchmen activities
have a "significant relationship" to maritime activities; (3) watchmen are "harbor-workers" and (4) watchmen subject to assignment
or activity aboard ship are amphibious workers who, due to their
amphibious nature, could be denied compensation for their work-related injuries over navigable waters. In evaluating the soundness of
the exclusion of "exclusively security" personnel under the 1984
LHWCA amendments, these arguments must be considered in light
of their treatment by the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuit Courts
who reversed the denial of LHWCA benefits by the BRB.
An Integral Part of Longshoring Operations
The argument that watchmen activities form an integral part of
the longshoring operation was presented forcefully by the Second
Circuit in its opinion reversing the BRB in Arbeeny v. McRoberts
Protective Agency.1 13 In Arbeeny, the court held -that pier guards
injured on waterfront piers were "engaged in maritime employment," under § 902(3) of the amended LHWCA."1 4 The court reasoned that the protection of cargo on piers, docks, and adjacent areas
from pilferage, vandalism, and fire served a maritime interest and
was essential to the longshoring operation. 1 5 According to the court,
the fact that "pilferage of cargo is endemic at piers" necessitated
11 6
security to preserve the safe transit of goods shipped by sea.
The fact that security services support the longshoring process,
however, does not make those services integral to the loading and
unloading of cargo. Congress, in restricting the class of persons covered under § 902(3), was concerned with protecting those individuals
who physically participate in the loading, unloading, repairing,
112. See Kelly, 13 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) at 610-11; Vaughn, 13 BEN. REV.
BD. SERV. (MB) at 679; Miller, 12 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) at 797-98; Conlon, 12
BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) at 475; Arbeeny, 12 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) at 437;
Holcomb, 11 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) at 839-41.
113. 642 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1981).
114. Id. at 675.
115. Id.
116. Id.

building or breaking of a vessel.11 As noted by the BRB in Vaughn
v. Lansdell Protective Agency,118 security guards are hired by all
kinds of businesses and provide support services incident to their operation. 119 All employees who work on piers, including clerical workers, are indirectly supporting maritime activity. One court has suggested that the LHWCA should be interpreted to cover all
waterfront employment.1 20 This view, however, would nullify the
"status" requirement of the LHWCA' 2 ' and was rejected in the
1984 amendments. 22 Indeed, the Second Circuit had specifically referred to guards as an example of "unlongshoremanlike" positions.123
This characterization, however, did not deter the Ninth Circuit in
Kelly v. Marine Terminals Corp.124 from adopting the Second Circuit's Arbeeny opinion as the basis for reversing BRB denial of coverage to an injured land-based watchman hired to guard empty
cargo containers.
Subsequently, the BRB supported the appellate court decisions in
Arbeeny and Kelly, which held that guard activity bore a realistically significant relationship to navigation and commerce. 1 5 These
later BRB decisions, however, involved injury to amphibious watchmen. Moreover, Administrative Appeals Judge Kalaris concurred
solely because the decisions
by the courts of appeals in Kelly and
1 28
Arbeeny were controlling.
All of these decisions could now be supported by the rationale of
eliminating hazardous jurisdictional choice. This dilemma, created
by the amphibious nature of the guard's work, was recognized by
Congress in promulgating the 1984 LHWCA amendments. 27 For
example, both claimants in Arbeeny were required at times to
117. As stated by the Committee Reports to the 1972 LHWCA amendments:
The Committee does not intend to cover employees who are not engaged in loading, unloading, repairing or building a vessel, just because they are injured in an
area adjoining navigable waters used for such activity. S. REP. No. 1125, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1972); H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11
(1972)).
118. 13 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 677 (1981).
119. Id. at 679.
120. Warren Bros. v. Nelson, 635 F.2d 552, 556 (6th Cir. 1980) (quoting G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 430 (2d ed. 1975)).
121. See Caputo, 432 U.S. at 249; Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544
F.2d 35, 56 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd in part, 432 U.S. 249 (1977).
122. 33 U.S.C.A. § 902(3)(A) (West Supp. 1985).
123. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d at 52.
124. 678 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1982).
125. Birdwell v. Western Tug & Barge, 16 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 321 (1984);
Conroy v. McRoberts Protective Agency, 15 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 198 (1982);
Groslouis v. American Patrol Service, 15 BEN. REv. BD. SERV. (MB) 184 (1982).
126. Conroy v. McRoberts Protective Agency, 15 BEN. REv. BD. SERV. (MB) 198,
200 (1982) (Kalaris, J., concurring); Groslouis v. American Patrol Serv., 15 BEN. REV.
BD. SERV. (MB) 184, 186 (1982) (Kalaris, J., concurring).
127. See supra note 19.
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"board vessels and position themselves on gangways, decks or in
ships, hatches, or holds."' 28 Similarly, the claimant in Kelly was subject to assignment aboard ship at the time of his injury. 2 '
Non-Office Clerical Employees
In promulgating the 1984 LHWCA amendments, Congress made
a distinction between exclusively security personnel and non-office
clerical employees by including the latter within the LHWCA coverage. As noted in the legislative history of the amendments:
Not all clerical work is intended to be excluded - merely that which is
performed exclusively in a business office of the employing enterprise.
Workers who may be classified as clerks or cargo checkers for example may
be deemed to be engaged, at times, in 'clerical' type work, but that work is
done in the areas in which cargo is handled, not exclusively in a business
office of the stevedore. In such circumstances, the checker or clerk would
remain within Longshore Act Jurisdiction.'

Presumably, the fact that "clerical work" is being performed "in
areas where cargo is handled" should not determine the issue of
"status" to receive benefits under the LHWCA. The LHWCA re-

quires a person to be "engaged in maritime employment,"' 3' necessi-

tating an analysis of the maritime character of the worker's occupa-

tion or employment activity.

32

Congress, however, in creating a "status" requirement in the 1972

amendments, contemplated the inclusion of non-office clerical employees within LHWCA coverage.' 3 3 Similarly, the Supreme Court
has held that checkers of cargo are engaged in the overall process of
loading and unloading vessels as altered by containerization 34 and
are, therefore, covered under the LHWCA. 135 Persons working exclusively as security guards are not engaged in the handling of cargo,
and therefore do not perform an integral part of longshoring
operations.
128. Arbeeny, 642 F.2d at 674.
129. Kelly, 13 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) at 612.
130. 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2736, 2737. See supra note 13.
131. 33 U.S.C.A. § 902(3) (West Supp. 1985).
132. Caputo, 432 U.S. at 249; Pfeiffer, 444 U.S. at 69.
133. Indeed, the Committee Reports explicitly state: "[C]heckers, for example,
who are directly involved in the loading or unloading functions are covered by the new
amendment." S. REP. No. 1125 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1972); H.R. REP. No. 1441 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1972). See also Caputo, 432 U.S. at 271.
134. Caputo, 432 U.S. at 270-71.
135. Id.at 271.

"Significant Relationship" to Maritime Activities
In Holcomb v. Robert W. Kirk & Associates,'3 6 the Fifth Circuit,
in a narrow opinion, held that a watchman of a ship docked in navigable waters was engaged in maritime employment when injured
while performing his duties onboard. 37 Claimant Holcomb was injured when he fell through an "open hatch" on the vessel he was
guarding. 138 The Fifth Circuit, in extending coverage, cited several
pre-1972 amendment decisions involving watchmen. 139 Some of these
decisions had been cited by Administrative Appeals Judge Miller in
his dissenting BRB opinion in Holcomb as evidence that there was
no maritime activity "more traditional than that performed by the
ship's watch. 1 40 As noted earlier, however, pre-1972 amendment decisions were decided affirmatively solely on the basis of the presence
of the employee on navigable waters. Whether or not the activities of
a particular watchman bore a "significant relationship" to navigation
and commerce under the 1972 LHWCA amendments, depended on
a functional analysis of his duties. Clearly, such an analysis was
lacking in Holcomb.
Subsequent to Holcomb, the Fifth Circuit, in Miller v. Central
Dispatch, Inc., 141 held that a claimant's activities had a "realistically significant relationship to maritime activity." Again, the holding focused on the amphibious nature of the work. The court noted
that claimant Miller, who was injured while aboard ship, "regularly
boarded vessels, generally performed her guard duties onboard vessels, and rendered services not to a ship repair yard but to oceangoing vessels.' 42 Hence neither the Holcomb decision nor the Miller
decision supports the conclusion that the work of a land-based guard
is of a maritime nature.
"Harbor-Workers"
No appellate court has argued that watchmen are "harbor-workers." Administrative Appeals Judge Miller, however, in his dissent in
Vaughn v. Lansdell Protective Agency,1 43 maintained that a pier
guard was a harbor worker as defined by the BRB. The BRB has
held that a "harbor worker" includes "at least those persons directly
involved in the construction, repair, alteration or maintenance of
harbor facilities (which includes docks, piers, wharves, and adjacent
136. 655 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1981).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 590.
139. See supra note 47.
140. Holcomb, 11 BEN. REv. BD. SERV. (MB) at 842.
141. 673 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1982).
142. Id. at 783.
143. 13 BEN. REv. BD.SERV. (MB) 677 (1981).
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areas used in the loading, unloading, repair or construction of
ships)." 144 Insofar as pier guards maintain security in terminal areas
used for loading and unloading, Judge Miller reasoned that security
guards are directly involved in the maintenance of a harbor facility;
"an activity which is clearly within the definition of harbor
1 45
worker. 1
In Brown & Root, Inc. v. Joyner,146 the Fourth Circuit affirmed
coverage based on the harbor worker status of two claimants engaged in the building of a dry dock. The words, "construction, repair, alteration and maintenance" denote building work by
carpenters, plumbers, painters, and laborers. Although a pier guard
may indirectly prevent vandalism or fire on a pier or terminal area,
it is unreasonable to say that a guard is directly involved with pier
maintenance.
"Amphibious Watchmen"
As noted previously, the dilemma of mutually exclusive compensation schemes threatening amphibious watchmen has been eliminated
by Congress under the 1984 LHWCA amendments. If state law
should exempt watchmen from coverage, then the Longshore exemption applicable to "exclusively security" personnel would not apply. 1-7 All of the decisions examined in this Comment extending
LHWCA benefits dealt with amphibious watchmen injured on a covered situs while in the course of their employment. The appellate
courts in attempting to prevent jurisdictional uncertainty, have provided strong dicta suggesting that even purely land-based watchmen
are engaged in maritime employment. Such a characterization is inconsistent with the status requirement which seeks to limit the types
of employees covered under the LHWCA.
Exclusivity of Employment
The 1984 LHWCA amendments only exclude from coverage "individuals employed exclusively to perform office clerical, secretarial,
security, or data processing work."'14 8 While Congress intended this
144. Stewart v. Brown & Root, Inc., 7 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 356, 365
(1978); Joyner v. Brown & Root, 7 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 608, 611 (1978).
145. Vaughn, 13 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) at 681-82.
146. 607 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 981 (1980).
147. See supra note 19.
148. 33 U.S.C.A. § 902(3)(A) (West Supp. 1985).

exclusion to be read very narrowly,1" 9 the 1984 LHWCA amendments raise questions regarding the effect of the exclusivity language. Will the checking of one container, on one occasion, by a fulltime security guard, act to extend LHWCA benefits to him if he
later is injured while on patrol? What is the consequence of a nonsecurity task which benefits an employer, although performed without the express permission of the employer? These and other questions of construction remain unanswered.
CONCLUSION

This Comment has considered the propriety of the 1984 Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act amendments, which
serve to exempt from coverage individuals employed exclusively to
perform as watchmen or pier guards. Although watchmen have been
provided coverage under the LHWCA in the past, the jurisdictional
dilemma of mutually exclusive compensation schemes no longer provides a basis for extending federal coverage. The 1984 LHWCA
amendments eliminate the jurisdictional dilemma by guaranteeing a
remedy to an injured watchman.
This Comment has also examined the case law, which has considered the maritime status of amphibious watchmen. These judicial
decisions fail to support the extension of federal coverage on the basis of the role of a watchman in the loading and unloading of cargo.
A watchman received coverage under the pre-1972 amendment decisions solely on the basis of his presence on navigable waters. There
was no status requirement for coverage under the LHWCA prior to
1972. Similarly, post-1972 amendment decisions can be justified only
on the basis of the Supreme Court's concern for amphibious workers
exposed to shifting coverage and perilous jurisdictional choice.150
Watchmen, like secretaries, office clerks and data processors, are
hired by all kinds of businesses and provide support services incident
to their operation. Unlike longshoremen or harbor workers, they are
not exposed to traditional maritime hazards in the course of their
working day. Congressional action in excluding "exclusively security" personnel from LHWCA coverage constitutes an attempt to
sharpen the amorphous phrase, "person engaged in maritime employment" under § 902(3). Although Congress has succeeded to
some extent in eliminating ambiguity, questions relating to "exclusivity" of employment create new challenges for judicial
interpretation.
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